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Abstract
A multi-stage model on the course of war is presented: Individual battles are
modeled as private value all-pay auctions with asymmetric combatants of two op-
posing teams. These auctions are placed within a multi-stage framework with a
tug-of-war structure. Such framing provides a microfounded rationale for the use of
the popular logit Tullock contest success function in models of militarized conflicts,
yields new theoretical justification for existing empirical findings with respect to
war, and provides new hypotheses regarding strategic battlefield behavior.
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1 Introduction
The history of mankind is a history of war. No age has passed without epic battles; and
no era without bloodshed and death. Even so, and in spite of its disastrous consequences
for combatants and civilians alike, the occurrence and the course of war is still very little
understood.
In recent political science literature, the occurrence of war is explained by a break-
down in peaceful bargaining between nations due to either information incompleteness
(e.g., Reiter 2003; Maoz & Siverson 2008) or to anticipated changes in the bargaining
environment (e.g., Powell 2004b, 2006). The course of war is modeled as a multi-stage
interaction with player’s alternately deciding whether to keep on fighting or to agree on
an allocation proposal made by the opponent (cf. Filson & Werner 2001, 2004, Powell
2004a, Leventoglu & Slantchev 2007). These approaches have certainly increased our
understanding of war and the deliberative aspects that go along with it. However, a
blind spot remains: the particular war or battle incident is not modeled explicitly, but is
represented by either a simple probability measure or by a function which maps actions
into outcome probabilities. It is these probabilities or functions which the participants
resort to when deciding over their actions. Probabilities or contest success functions
(CSF) themselves, however, remain unexplained by the models.
This paper sets out to explain this lottery character of militarized interaction. In
order to do so, a different perspective on war is adopted: if we want to understand
war, we need to understand what happens on the battlefield. This leads to the study of
individual combatant behavior. It is hardly surprising that this has been done before:
going back two centuries in the history of military thought, the work of the Prussian
military theorist Carl von Clausewitz reads like a modern, decision-theoretic analysis of
battlefield behavior: a contestant going to battle will, as von Clausewitz (1982 [1832],
104) argues, consider possible enemy types as a guideline for his actions. In particular,
he argues as follows:
“If we desire to defeat the enemy, wemust proportion our efforts to his powers
of resistance."
These “powers of resistance" are two-dimensional. They are given by
“the product of two factors which cannot be separated, namely, the sum of
available means and the strength of [w]ill."
Handling these two dimensions is not straightforward, as one of the two is prone to
uncertainty:
“The sum of available means may be estimated in a measure, as it depends
(although not entirely) upon numbers; but the strength of volition is more
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difficult to determine, and can only be estimated to a certain extent by the
strength of the motives."
And as if foreseeing Bayesian concepts, von Clausewitz (1982 [1832], 109) continues:
“From character, the measures, the situation of the adversary, and the rela-
tions with which he is surrounded, each side will draw conclusions by the law
of probability as to the designs of the other, and act accordingly." (emphasis
added)
Clausewitz indicates that warfare necessitates handling two type dimensions in an ap-
propriate fashion. One of these – material strength – is common knowledge; the other
one – an individual motive – is private information. Acknowledging the fact that both
sides choose their actions interdependently, we are in a modern game theoretic frame-
work. More concretely, Clausewitz’s writing neatly fits into a description of an auc-
tion with asymmetrically effective bid submissions: his “powers of resistance" are in-
terpretable as winning relevant bids which are given by the product of “the strength of
will" – that is of actual bids – and of some efficacy parameter that he calls “the sum
of available means". The “strength of will" depends on individual “motives". These
are interpreted as private combatant valuations. Valuations, in turn, are drawn from
commonly known distributions – as introduced by the agents’ “strength of the motives".
Lastly, we may reasonably assume that bids are paid irrespective of the battle outcome.
Following this reasoning, a battle is structurally equivalent to a modified private value
all-pay auction.
This very idea of a battle is spelled out in the following. It will be combined with
modeling war as a multi-stage contest, with the succession of battles being determined
by a tug-of-war structure. This yields a course of war that has a simple Markov structure
with a Bayesian Nash equilibrium at every stage.
The set-up allows for a description of war by means of the logit Tullock contest
success function – so, the following may be read as a microfoundation of this popular
CSF. Microfoundations in other contexts exist and are found for example in Fullerton &
McAfee (1999) for research tournaments, or in Lagerlöf (2007) for classical rent-seeking
contests.1 In contrast to these, however, the logit CSF gained here does not follow di-
rectly from the stochastic environment chosen but from the strategies employed by the
agents. It emerges as a consequence of equilibrium play.
Beyond that, the results will be used to formulate hypotheses on battlefield behavior.
Some fit in with recent empirical findings, some are novel: Fighting efforts are fiercest
1Further, Baye & Hoppe (2003) find that rent-seeking games, innovation tournaments and patent races
are strategically equivalent and expressible via a Tullock contest success function. Axiomatic studies
are found in Skaperdas (1996), Kooreman & Schoonbeek (1997), or in Clark & Riis (1998). For a more
extensive survey of the literature, see Konrad (2009).
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when the advantaged nation is on the edge of defeat and decrease with its closeness
to victory. These fluctuations in efforts across war states are the more pronounced the
more asymmetric the adversaries are. The materially disadvantaged nation is found
to fight more aggressively, and war duration is negatively correlated with the degree of
asymmetry between warring parties.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the basic
ideas and reviews the relevant literature. In Section 3, the model is formalized and the
equilibrium characterized. Comparative statics are presented in Section 4. Section 5
relates the results to war empirics and concludes.
2 Explicitly Modeling War
There are two distinct features of the approach that require some introductory remarks
before the formal model can be stated: (i) war as a tug-of-war and (ii) battle as a private
value all-pay-auction. The following considerations are essential for the model to be set
up.
2.1 War as Tug-of-War
A tug-of-war is a sports contest between two teams pulling on opposite ends of a rope.
The aim is to pull the adversary over a ground mark initially lying between the teams.
The crucial feature of this type of game is that the winner is not declared by means of
absolute gains, but in terms of gain differences over the adversary. Applying this idea
to the case of militarized disputes, war is assumed to consist of a sequence of battles
and a nation is said to be victorious as soon as its battle victories exceed its battle de-
feats by a certain number. That is, contestants need to top the adversary by a given
number of surplus victories - irrespective of absolute victories. Such a design renders a
contest potentially infinitely long but this in turn will yield a structure that is elegantly
analytically tractable.
In political science, the idea of modeling war as a tug-of-war is found in Smith (1998)
and in Smith & Stam (2003, 2004). These models assume that a tug-of-war structure
is a suitable analogy for militarized disputes and defend this assertion with the argu-
ments that wars usually exhibit changing positional advantages and that our every-day
vocabulary of militarized disputes is replete with notions that link war to this kind of
sports contest. Other formulations of multi-stage contests with a tug-of-war structure
are found in Konrad & Kovenock (2005) or Agastya & McAfee (2006).
Contrary to the approaches above, however, the following approach will not model
war as a succession of interactions between entire teams, but rather as interactions
between individual units of two opposing teams. In every such battle, a new unit is sent
to field. The aim of the units is to win a battle in order to get their team closer to overall
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victory. To keep the analysis as simple as possible, the units will be assumed to consist
of one single combatant.
2.2 Battle as All-Pay-Auction
Returning to Clausewitz’s understanding of battle, combatant behavior is understood as
the product of interdependent reasoning over innate and adversarial strength attributes.
The attributes considered are material strength as well as motivational strength. Such a
two-dimensional description is certainly not too remote from current military research:
for example, Biddle (2004) advocates the use of differentiated capability measures in
order to explain war success and failure. In military psychology and psychiatry on the
other hand, the denominations of troop morale, troop cohesion and esprit de corps refer
to individual and group states that are seen to be highly important for battlefield success
(cf. Manning 1994, Siebold 2006, Newsome 2007). These concepts date back to military
classics such as du Picq (2008 [1880]) and Marshall (2000 [1947]), both of which analyze
and emphasize troop morale and other psychological states as key ingredients to victory.
The Clausewitzian analysis prompts an understanding of battle as being structurally
equivalent to a private value all-pay auction. Two considerations diverge from the
canonically symmetric all-pay auction model: Firstly, contestants feature asymmetry
in their individual strength levels (differing available means in Clausewitzian terms),
which is assumed to affect the actual bid needed in order to win. Secondly, contestants
need not be symmetrically motivated; that is, in auction theoretic terms, they feature
asymmetries in their value distributions (differing strengths of motives, as Clausewitz
says). Each of these asymmetries has been analyzed individually in Amman & Leininger
(1996), and in Feess, Muehlheusser &Walzl (2008), respectively – but not yet jointly, and
not yet in a multistage setting.
Another noteworthy departure from traditional modeling approaches consists in the
role of information. The existing literature on multi-stage auctions generally assumes
commonly known valuations at every stage (cf. Agastya & McAfee 2006, and Konrad &
Kovenock 2005, 2009, 2010). Such an assumption makes sense, of course, if we think of a
succession of auctions with personally identical players at every stage. Framed like this,
the players’ behavior in the first stage is fully type-revealing, and there is no uncertainty
in the subsequent stages. The scenario for war is different. War is unlikely to involve
a succession of interactions between personally identical players, and hence commonly
known valuations are not assumed.
In the war scenario, uncertainty at every stage is established by two distinct features
of the model: firstly, teams are modeled to send their members randomly to field, and
secondly, valuations are modeled to be independent both within and across teams. The
first feature is motivated by the idea of a residual uncertainty that every team faces
regarding the factual valuations of its members. The second feature accompanies the
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[
defeatA
victoryB
] [
victoryA
defeatB
]
Figure 1: Tug-of-War Structure
assumption that there is no interdependence between individual valuations for victory
and some objective value of the goal of war. Both these assumptions have supportive
evidence in the aforementioned war psychiatry findings which relate individual combat-
ant motivation more to – notably stochastic – personal and troop circumstances than to
specified war objectives (c.f. especially the extended discussion of soldier motivation in
Newsome 2007, Chapter 5).
Lastly, note that an all-pay auction constitutes a special case of a contest featuring
a discontinuous contest success function. The contestant employing the highest effort
wins with a probability of one. Thus, there is no uncertainty incorporated in the success
function itself. Of course, this might seem too simple and be at odds with the real terms
of war, where imponderabilities besides fighting efforts abound. However, by ignoring
these very stochastic effects, analysis can focus on strategy choice that is solely based on
the attributes of the two warring nations.
3 The Model
War is regarded as a tug-of-war between two opposing teams i ∈ {A,B}, both with a
potentially infinite number of members. In every battle, each team sends one member
randomly to field. After battle, both members rejoin their respective teams, and again a
new fighter is chosen randomly by each team. A team is said to have won the contest, if
its number of battle victories exceeds the number of victories by the opposing team by a
certain number, n.
If team i leads by z battles, it is said to be in individual state k i = z; if it runs behind
z battles, it is said to be in state k i = −z; if both are equal, both are said to be in state
k i = 0. Hence, by construction if team A is in state kA, team B is in state kB =−kA, and
vice versa.
Combining individual state denotations yields what will be called the war state. A
war state is described by S := kA = −kB referring to team A as being in its individual
state kA and team B being in its individual state kB =−kA. A graphical intuition for this
notation is given in Figure 1. S increases in team A’s victories, and decreases in team B’s
victories respectively. War is over if either team A wins in S = (n−1) or if team B wins in
S =−(n−1). The distinction between individual states and war states, respectively, will
prove to be helpful in analysis, for it allows us to firstly trace the individual and then
the interdependent decision problem.
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Members of each team i attach a certain individual valuation vi to final team victory
– that is, battle victories are merely instrumental in nature and do not feature an intrin-
sic value for agents. Valuations vi refer to the Clausewitzean notion of motives. Motives
vi are best interpreted as the member’s willingness to pay for their team’s overall war
victory. Since players are utility maximizer, they will never fully pay up to their vi, but
optimize efforts with respect to anticipated adversarial actions.
Individual valuations vi are assumed to be independently and uniformly distributed
on a support [0,vi], vi ∈R+. Valuations are not only independent within but across teams
as well. Distributions of possible valuations are denoted by Fi and supposed to be public
knowledge. Actual individual valuation draws, however, are known to the holder alone.
The width of the distribution support, [0,vi], parallels the Clausewitzen idea of the
strength of motives. The upper bound of the support, vi, will further on be denoted as
the motivational strength of a team and the notions of valuation and motivation will be
used interchangeably.
In battle, contestants exert some level of effort, b i,S. This is equivalent to the bid
in the classical auction setting: Effort is modeled as a function that has valuation as
an argument – βi,S : [0,vi]→ R, vi 7→ b i,S = βi,S(vi). The notion of effort level captures
the Clausewitzian concept of the strength of will which is determined by motives in war.
With the terminology used hereafter, b i,S will be denoted as observed battlefield efforts.
Further, members of each respective team are homogeneous in their abilities to fight,
but fighting abilities differ between teams. Members of team i are said to have fighting
ability αi ∈ R+ which refers to their (common) ability to transform observed battlefield
efforts into effective battlefield efforts. This captures the Clausewitzian idea of material
strength, which is to be seen as a measure for the effectiveness of observed battle efforts.
It will be these effective efforts upon which victory and defeat are decided: A is denoted
the winner of the battle if his effective battlefield efforts exceed those of participant
B, that is, if αAβA,S(vA) > αBβB,S(vB). Translated back into Clausewitzian terms, this
means that the player with the higher level of powers of resistance is victorious.
Lastly, agents are assumed to be risk-neutral, and utility functions to be additively
separable in the valuation of final victory (if obtained) and the cost of the effort expended.
Costs of efforts are assumed to correspond to the effort level chosen, that is, c(b i,S)= b i,S.
3.1 The Course of War
To start, the case with teams needing n = 2 surplus victories in order to win war is
considered. Section 3.2 will then deliver a generalization to any arbitrary n ≥ 2. Teams
begin the contest symmetrically, that is, both teams begin in a state where they fight for
the option of imposing decisive defeat upon the opponent in the round to come. For the
victorious team, this following round yields the possibility of winning decisively. For the
losing team in the preceding round, the second round yields the option of starting anew
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– should it win – in a symmetric situation. Hence, in the second round the tug-of-war
is either over or starts anew in the initial setting. For analysis then, three individual
states k i = {−1,0,1} and three war states S = kA = {−1,0,1} are of interest.
A combatant going to battle faces the following payoff structure:
Ui,ki (vi,b i,ki )=

Vi,ki+1−b i,ki if αib i,k >α jβ j,−ki (v j)Vi,ki−1−b i,ki else (1)
with Vi,ki denoting the value of the individual state k i to the combatant of team i re-
turning from battle to that very state.
How do we have to think about Vi,ki? Remember that battles do not feature intrinsic
value to combatants. Hence competition in battle is about positions only – that is, agents
fight over a more advantageous state for their team in the round to come. The value of
the round to come hinges on the expected outcomes of even further battles over which the
present combatants have no control. To capture this let Vi,ki with k i = {−1,0,1}, i = {A,B}
be written as follows:
Vi,1 = pi,1vi+ (1− pi,1)Vi,0 (2)
Vi,0 = pi,0Vi,1+ (1− pi,0)Vi,−1 (3)
Vi,−1 = pi,−1Vi,0+ (1− pi,−1)0 (4)
The state value is computed as the weighted sum of the value of the next-higher
state and the value of the next-lower state which will be reached after the consecutive
battle with a battle outcome probability of pi,ki and 1− pi,ki , respectively. There is no
discounting assumed. For example, returning from battle in individual state k i = 0
yields the value of state k i = 1 with probability pi,0, and the value of state k i =−1 with
probability (1− pi,0). As will be shown shortly, battle outcome probabilities are properly
defined in equilibrium and are hence anticipatable.
Rearranging terms leads to:
Vi,1 =
pi,1(1− pi,−1(1− pi,0))
1− pi,−1(1− pi,0)− pi,0(1− pi,1)
vi (5)
Vi,0 =
pi,0pi,1
1− pi,−1(1− pi,0)− pi,0(1− pi,1)
vi (6)
Vi,−1 =
pi,−1pi,0pi,1
1− pi,−1(1− pi,0)− pi,0(1− pi,1)
vi (7)
In order to ease notation, let Vi,ki be defined as
Vi,ki =ϕi,kivi (8)
where ϕi,kivi denotes the individual state value for a participant as a fraction ϕi,ki of
vi. In order to complete the description, define further ϕi,2 := 1, and ϕi,−2 := 0 as the
fraction of the valuation gained when the overall war is won, or lost respectively.
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Hence, in the case of the winning battle, gains to participant i in state k i consist
in a fraction ϕi,ki+1 of the overall valuation for victory, whereas losing yields a (lower)
fraction ϕi,ki−1. The game thus yields a payoff of ϕi,ki−1vi with certainty and, in the case
of winning, an additional payoff of
(
ϕi,ki+1−ϕi,ki−1
)
vi.
A closer look at this latter expression is necessary. In order to do so, it is convenient to
switch from individual state notation (k i) to war state notation (S = kA =−kB). Keeping
in mind that pA,kA = (1− pB,kB ),∀kA =−kB, simple algebra is applied to arrive at:
Lemma 1. Let φi,ki := ϕi,ki+1 −ϕi,ki−1, i ∈ {A,B} denote the fraction of the additional
payoff φi,kivi in the case of winning a battle in individual state k i for agents of team
i. Then, in every war state S = kA = −kB, additional payoff fractions are equal for both
team’s agents and are given by:
φS :=φA,kA =φB,kB (9)
Lemma 1 states that additional payoffs are equal for both agents for a given battle.
This result is important: Expression (9) facilitates analysis, and the optimizing problem
for each candidate can finally be stated. Recalling that uniform distribution of valua-
tions is assumed and replacing individual state indices in ϕi,ki by war state indices S,
the respective battle-utilities are written as:
UA,S(vA ,bA,S)=
β−1
B,S
(
αA
αB
bA,S)
vB
φSvA +ϕA,S−1vA −bA,S (10)
UB,S(vB,bB,S)=
β−1
A,S
(
αB
αA
bB,S)
vA
φSvB+ϕB,−(S−1)vB−bB,S (11)
Equations (10) and (11) depict respective additional gains from winning the contest
multiplied by the probability of winning given a certain effort level b i,S plus the valua-
tion fraction received in the case of defeat minus the cost of the efforts to be expended.
The fraction that is gained in the case of defeat is obtained with certainty and will hence
not be relevant for the optimizing problem.
In order to find the utility maximizing efforts bA,S and bB,S, respectively, FOC’s for
both candidates with respect to their efforts are taken. Replacing b i,S by the bidding
function βi,S(vi) leads to the following system of differential equations:
FOCbA,S : vA = vB
αB
αA
β′B,S
(
β−1B,S
(
αA
αB
βA,S (vA)
))
φ−1S (12)
FOCbB,S : vB = vA
αA
αB
β′A,S
(
β−1A,S
(
αB
αA
βB,S (vB)
))
φ−1S (13)
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Equilibrium analysis will be restricted to bidding functions meeting this differential
equation system. The route of looking at differential equation systems of this type is
fairly common in the literature on all-pay auctions. For example, Amman & Leininger
(1996) thus analyze asymmetric value distributions, and the special case with φS = 1,
vA = vB = 1, and αA 6= αB is treated in Feess et al. (2008). Proceeding by “guessing and
verifying" leads to:
Proposition 1. The unique equilibrium effort functions2 complying with (12) and (13)
are:
βA,S(vA)=φS
αB
αAvA+αBvB
vBv
1−
αAvA +αBvB
αAvA
A
v
αAvA+αBvB
αAvA
A
(14)
βB,S(vB)=φS
αA
αAvA+αBvB
vAv
1−
αAvA +αBvB
αBvB
B
v
αAvA+αBvB
αBvB
B
(15)
Proof. Since (12) and (13) constitute an ordinary differential equation (ODE) system, we
know that, if a continuous and locally differentiable solution trajectory for a given ODE
system for a given boundary condition exists, the solution is unique for that boundary
condition (cf. Theorem 3.1 in Hale 2009). The only possible boundary condition for the
problem is given by βA,S(0)=βB,S(0)= 0: no participant with zero valuation will expend
strictly positive efforts, since this necessarily leads to negative utility. Therefore, if there
is a solution meeting the boundary condition βA,S(0) = βB,S(0) = 0, the solution is the
unique candidate to constitute an equilibrium. Note that (14) and (15) are continuous,
locally differentiable and meet the specified boundary condition, and that plugging (14)
and (15) into (12) and (13) indeed verifies that the functions presented in Proposition
1 constitute a solution. Hence, (14) and (15) constitute the unique candidate for an
equilibrium.
In order to constitute an equilibrium, (14) and (15) need to apply with incentive
compatibility and a rationality constraint (cf. Myerson 1981). The rationality constraint
requires that equilibrium utilityU∗(0)≥ 0. This condition is met since we have βA,S(0)=
βB,S(0)= 0; i.e., no efforts are expended with zero valuation. On the other hand, incen-
tive compatibility implies non-decreasing effort functions (cf. Krishna 2002). Obviously,
(14) and (15) are non-decreasing in vA , and vB respectively. Hence, (14) and (15) indeed
constitute an equilibrium and this equilibrium is unique for the conditions specified in
(12) and (13).
2Note that the equilibrium functions obtained correspond to the well-known symmetric equilibrium if
αA =αB = 1 and vA = vB = 1 (cf. Krishna 2002).
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Hence, for a given set of parameters (αA,αB,vA,vB), equilibrium efforts only change
in φS across states. In order to derive φS, expected battle winning probabilities pi,ki
with randomly chosen combatants are computed.
Lemma 2. Expected battle outcome probabilities pi for team i playing against team j,
i, j ∈ {A,B}, i 6= j, are war state independent and given by:
pi :=
∫vi
0
β−1
j,S
(
αi
α j
βi,S(vi)
)
v j
dFi(vi)=
αivi
αivi+α jv j
,∀S (16)
Proof. Note that, assuming uniform distribution, the probability of winning for combat-
ant i is given by:
P
(
αiβi,S(vi)>α jβ j,S(v j)
)
=
β−1
j,S
(
αi
α j
βi,S(vi)
)
v j
. (17)
Computing the expected value of this probability along with plugging in equilibrium
effort functions (14) and (15) yields the result.
Agents on the battlefield behave in a way that results in equal outcome probabilities
across all war states. Such war-state independent battle outcome probabilities are strik-
ing, since incentives change with respect to war states: with Lemma 2, additional payoff
fractions, φS, can now be derived, and it turns out that they are not independent of the
war state S.3
Proposition 2. The state variables φS , S = {−1,0,1} are given by:
φS =


α2
A
v2A
α2
A
v2A+α
2
B
v2B
if S =−1
αAvAαBvB
α2
A
v2A+α
2
B
v2B
if S = 0
α2
B
v2B
α2
A
v2A+α
2
B
v2B
if S = 1
(18)
Proof. Substitute (16) into the definition of φS as given in (9).
This concludes equilibrium analysis for n = 2. By Propositions 1 and 2, the equilib-
rium is fully characterized.
3For an extended discussion on φS, refer to Section 4.1.2.
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3.2 Generalization to n≥ 2
The results obtained in Lemmata 1 and 2 as well as those obtained in Proposition 1
carry over to the more general case of n ≥ 2 surplus battle victories needed in order to
win war.
Note that a sufficient condition for the feasibility of such a generalization is that the
fraction φS, S ∈ {−n+1, ...,n−1} of the additional payoff φSvi in the case of winning is
equal for agents of both teams for a given S and for all n. Proposition 3 states that this
is indeed the case:
Proposition 3. (Generalization of Lemma 1) Take the case of n surplus battle victories
needed in order to win war. Then, the fractions φi,S, S ∈ {−n+1, ...,n−1} of the additional
payoff φi,Svi as stated in Lemma 1 are equal for agents of both teams i = {A,B} for a given
S.
Proof. See Appendix A.
As a consequence of Proposition 3, equilibrium bidding functions are as given in
Proposition 1, and battle outcome probabilities remain constant across war states and
are as given in Lemma 2. Finally, to get an analogon to Proposition 2 for the generalized
n-case, it is a matter of simple algebra to compute values of φS by repeating the steps
taken to arrive at Lemma 1 and resorting to battle outcome probabilities pA. So, in
any case of n, φS is properly defined and this in turn allows for a direct analysis of the
general n-case in the following.
3.3 War Winning Probabilities
With state-independent battle outcome probabilities, war boils down to a random walk
over war states S = {−(n−1), ...,n−1} that ends with a victory of the respective lead-
ing team in either of the fringe states S = {−(n− 1),n− 1}. Assuming war to start in
middle state S = 0, the problem of overall winning probabilities for war is structurally
equivalent to the so-called Gambler’s Ruin Problem with two gamblers initially equally
endowed with n units.4 Consequently, overall outcome probabilities are to be described
as follows:
Proposition 4. The overall winning probability, pin
i
, of nation i endowed with mate-
rial strength αi and motivational support [0,vi] faced with nation j characterized by α j
4The Gambler’s Ruin Problem describes a repeated lottery game between two players, A and B, each of
whom is endowed with some (finite) capital endowment. At every stage, one unit of capital is transferred
from A to B with some probability, or from B to A with the respective complementary probability. The
game ends as soon as the first player is bankrupt (cf. Takacs 1969).
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and
[
0,v j
]
in a tug-of-war contest with symmetric initial positions and a difference of n
victories needed in order to win is given by:
pini =
pn
i
pn
i
+ pn
j
=
αn
i
vni
αn
i
vni +α
n
j
vnj
(19)
Proof. The probability pin
i
of prevailing in war with symmetric initial positions and with
n surplus battles needed in order to win is equal to the complementary absorption prob-
ability with equal starting endowment n as given in Stern (1975):
pini =
1−
(
1− pi
pi
)n
1−
(
1− pi
pi
)2n (20)
Rearranging leads to Proposition 9.
Overall outcome probabilities take the shape of the logit Tullock contest success
function. This CSF is highly popular in models of militarized conflicts (cf. Garfinkel &
Skaperdas (2000); Hirschleifer (2000); Anbarci et al. (2002); Slantchev (2005)). Further,
we find it extensively used in rent-seeking analysis (see Nitzan (1994) for an overview).
Snyder (1989) applies the idea to political election contests. Usually, forms with n ≤ 2
are studied. See Baye, Kovenock & de Vries (1994) for a mixed strategy equilibrium with
n> 2.
4 Comparative Statics
Let D = (αA,αB,vA,vB), D ∈ R
4
+ denote a description of the exogenous attributes of the
two teams in the game and additionally let pA|D and pB|D = 1−pA|D stand for the battle
outcome probabilities generated by description D as in (16). By definition, pA|D ∈ (0,1).
Whenever reasonable, reference to D in pA|D will be dispensed with and simply pA be
written.
Definition 1. Team i is called advantaged over team j, or favorite respectively, if its
probability of succeeding in battle exceeds that of its opponent, i.e. if pi > p j. Further, a
team i is called motivationally or materially advantaged if vi > v j, or αi >α j respectively.
By setting
pi
p j
=
αivi
α jv j
(21)
it is obvious that the question of advantage is driven by material strength and moti-
vational support alike. Being materially disadvantaged does not imply an overall dis-
advantag as material incapability can be compensated directly by featuring a larger
motivational support.
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Figure 2: Bidding Behavior with Differing Asymmetries
4.1 Asymmetry and Battlefield Behavior
In the following, a short description of individual battlefield behavior is given. Then,
expected individual and aggregate behavior is scrutinized. And beyond that, effects on
war duration by shifts in the balance of powers will be analyzed. The term effort will
always refer to observed battlefield effort.
4.1.1 Individual Efforts
The factors affecting individual efforts are best looked at by distinguishing between
effects of material asymmetry on the one hand and effects of motivational asymmetry on
the other hand. This will be done by reference to Figure 2. Figure 2 depicts the (n = 2)-
case with equilibrium efforts b i,S depending on valuation vi for both candidates i, for
war states S ∈ {−1,0,1}, and for differing degrees of asymmetry.
A graphical intuition for the effect of differing degrees in material asymmetry is ob-
tained by comparing the shape of effort functions across equal war states S for differing
(αA,αB)-values as in the first and second row of Figure 2. With motivational symmetry
but material asymmetry, the bidding function of the advantaged party becomes flatter,
whereas the underdog with relatively high valuation exerts higher efforts than in the
symmetrical case. Taking into account that the underdog needs relatively more effort in
order to win, this makes perfect sense: the underdog exerts relatively little effort when
valuations are low since his chances of winning are limited by low material strength. An
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underdog holding a high valuation, however, acts more aggressively as he compensates
for the material handicap in order to optimize expected battle utility. So, in terms of ef-
fort employed, the aspect of participant type becomes more important with the underdog
than with the advantaged party.
With respect to motivational asymmetry, similar effects are observed. The subfigures
in the third row of Figure (2) show the effort strategy of the advantaged participant to
flatten out and the disadvantaged participant with relatively high valuations to fight
more aggressively than in the symmetrical case. The advantaged participant expends
less effort, since he can expect an overall lower willingness to pay for victory with mem-
bers of the adversarial team. On the other hand, underdogs i with valuations close to
the upper bound vi play optimally by expending greater efforts than favorite combatants
with equal valuations: underdog types with high valuations adopt equilibrium efforts of
favorite types j with valuations similarly close to the respective upper bound v j as a
guide. This is so in equilibrium, since, by expending less effort, the underdog would
lessen his chances of winning by more than he would save on effort expenditure.
4.1.2 Expected Efforts
Since the idea of randomness in choosing agents is a key assumption of the model, the
scrutiny of expected behavior is of particular interest. Not only does such analysis yield
the sharpest results, but it furthermore yields potentially testable hypotheses against
the background of an assumed participant description D.
It will prove to be fruitful to write the expressions of interest with respect to the
battle winning probabilities of team A: Let expected individual efforts (Eβi,S) and total
expected efforts (Eβtot,S) in war state S be written as
EβA,S =φS
pA(1− pA)
1+ pA
vA (22)
EβB,S =φS
pA(1− pA)
2− pA
vB (23)
Eβtot,S =φSpA(1− pA)
[
vA
1+ pA
+
vB
2− pA
]
(24)
Absolute Strength Levels A first observation concerns the ratio between respective
strength levels for a description D = (αA,αB,vA ,vB); i.e., the ratios between material
strength levels on the one hand and motivational strength levels on the other hand.
The model predicts quantitatively the same behavior for an armed conflict between
materially weak adversaries as it does for materially stronger candidates - given that
the balance of powers in terms of material attributes is the same. Such is not the case
for motivational attributes. Given a certain ratio of team motivation, expected efforts
increase in absolute levels of team motivation:
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Proposition 5. (Absolute strength levels) Take any description D = (αA,αB, vA,vB).
(a) Keep a certain material strength ratio,
αA
αB
, fixed. Then, expected individual and
expected total efforts do not change ceteris paribus in absolute levels of (αA,αB).
(b) Keep a certain motivational strength ratio,
vA
vB
, fixed. Then, expected individual and
expected total efforts increase ceteris paribus in absolute levels of (vA ,vB).
Proof. Note that by (16), pA is homogeneous of degree zero in (αA,αB) as well as in
(vA,vB). By (18), φi, as well is homogeneous of degree zero in (αA,αB) and in (vA,vB).
Hence, by (22), (23), and (24), expected efforts only change in pA and in vi, and thus do
not change if both αA and αB are multiplied by some constant c. This proves (a). On the
other hand, if both vA and vB are multiplied by some constant c, pA does not change,
but as expected individual and total efforts are homogeneous of degree 1 in (vA ,vB), both
measures change by factor c. This proves (b).
Relative Aggressiveness Let us switch to the analysis of expected behavior under
differing advantages in both αi and vi. As it turns out, weakness in material strength
leads to aggression, whereas weakness in motivational strength leads to moderation:
Proposition 6. (Relative Aggressiveness) Take any description D = (αA,αB, vA ,vB). Gen-
erally,
∂
EβA,S
EβB,S
∂αA
< 0,
∂
EβA,S
EβB,S
∂vA
> 0,∀S. (25)
And especially
(a) If αA >αB,vA = vB, then EβA,S <EβB,S,∀S.
(b) If αA =αB,vA > vB, then EβA,S >EβB,S,∀S.
Proof. See B.
Proposition 6 holds for all war states and for all n, since by (22) and (23),
EβA,S
EβB,S
is
independent of S. A ceteris paribus increase in innate material strength, αi, yields a
more favorable strength ratio
αi
α j
and leads to decreasing own expected efforts relative
to the efforts of the adversary. Taking a description D with equal motivational strength,
vA = vB, yields the sharpest result in this vein, since then combatants of the materially
advantaged team expend relatively less expected effort than their underdog counter-
parts. The same effect with inverse signs is observed for motivational attributes. Here,
the greater the advantage, the more efforts are expended relatively: combatants of a
favorite team that is favorite only because of motivational advantages fight more ag-
gressively than their adversaries.
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Embattled Favorite With perfectly symmetric teams, we can see by inspection of
(22), (23), and (18) that expected efforts are the same for both teams and across all war
states. Above, we have seen that with differing balances of power, expected efforts differ
between teams within a certain war state. This is not the end of the story: asymmetry
between teams affects expected efforts across war states, as well. In particular, greatest
expected individual and total efforts are observed when the favorite team is on the edge
of defeat.
Proposition 7. (Embattled Favorite) Take any description D = (αA,αB,vA, vB) with re-
spective pA|D > pB|D and n surplus battles needed in order to win war, then
φ−(n−1) >φ−(n−2) > . . .>φn−2 >φn−1 (26)
and hence
Eβi,−(n−1) >Eβi,−(n−2) > . . .>Eβi,n−2 >Eβi,n−1, i ∈ {A,B} (27)
Eβtot,−(n−1) >Eβtot,−(n−2) > . . .>Eβtot,n−2 >Eβtot,n−1 (28)
Proof. See C.
Expected individual and total efforts decrease monotonically in the favorite’s close-
ness to victory. To make sense of this effect, we must take a closer look at the war state
variable φS. φS refers to the difference in winning and losing fractions of war victory
valuations and has been shown to be equal for both participants for a given war state S.
An intuition for the differences φS goes as follows: Note that it is φS alone that
affects behavior across states for a given description D. Hence, we can interpret φS as
an incentive to expend effort. This incentive looses more force, the closer the advantaged
team comes to decisive victory: to the advantaged team, losing while being the front
runner bears a comparably small risk of overall defeat, since the chances of returning to
the decisive fringe state remain intact. For the disadvantaged, the incentive to expend
effort while being on the edge of defeat is small as there is little chance of winning in
future battles. Contrarily, if the disadvantaged participant is closer to victory, he then
has a strong incentive to strive, since there is little chance that his team will ever return
to such a favorable position again. Likewise, the advantaged participant faces high
stakes on the edge of defeat.
Effort Volatility Battlefield behavior exhibits greatest effort when the favorite team
is on the edge defeat and the least effort when it is close to victory – we shall refer to
this fact as fringe state volatility. We will see that fringe state volatility is positively
dependent on asymmetries between nations.
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In order to compare strength asymmetry and effort volatility, it is convenient to in-
troduce a measure for the degree of dispersion in any two variables (x, y) that is capable
of analogously capturing the ideas of strength asymmetry and effort volatility in a rea-
sonable way. A useful measure is the absolute logarithmic difference between x and
y:
Definition 2. Let
δ(x, y) :=
∣∣∣∣ln
(
x
y
)∣∣∣∣with x, y ∈R+ (29)
denote a measure for the dispersion between x and y.5
Approximately, δ(x, y) describes the absolute percentage difference between x and y.
δ(x, y) is symmetric in the sense that δ(x, y)= δ(y, x), homogeneous of degree zero in (x, y)
and increasing in max{x, y} as well as decreasing in min{x, y}. As we are dealing with
ratio measures, this is very convenient.
With this, the imbalance of powers between two teams are defined by resorting to
battle outcome probabilities. Let
I(pA) := δ(pA,1− pA)= |ln(pA)− ln(1− pA)| (30)
stand for the degree of imbalance between A and B. I(pA) features a global minimum
at pA = (1− pA)= 0.5 and exhibits positive slopes with pA 6= 0.5.
Analogously, volatility V (pA) in efforts is understood as dispersion between expected
efforts in the two fringe states S = {−(n−1),n−1}:
V (pA) := δ(Eβi,−(n−1),Eβi,n−1)= δ(Eβtot,−(n−1),Eβtot,n−1) (31)
=
∣∣ln[φ−(n−1)(pA)]− ln[φn−1(pA)]∣∣ (32)
We can now return to the claim that an increase in the imbalance of powers leads to a
higher fringe state volatility in efforts:
Proposition 8. (Effort Volatility) Take any description D = (αA,αB,vA ,vB) with respec-
tive battle outcome probability pA|D and n surplus battle victories needed in order to
win. Then volatility V (pA) between expected individual as well as between expected total
efforts in fringe war states S = {−(n−1),n−1} is increasing in the imbalance of powers
I(pA).
Proof. See D.
5Note that δ(x, y) is a reformulation of the Thompson metric for the two-dimensional case, d(x, y) =
max{ln( x
y
), ln(
y
x
)}.
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Figure 3: Expected Efforts with vA = vB = 1 and changing pA
We can make sense of this observation with a consideration similar to that above:
The higher the asymmetries between contestants are, the higher are the relative battle
outcome probabilities of the favorite team. This implies that the stakes of the favorite on
the edge of defeat increase in its superiority over its opponent. Analogously, incentives
to expend efforts in the decisive state before victory decrease, since chances of returning
to that very state increase.
This concludes the comparative statics analysis with respect to efforts. To sum up,
changes in the balance of power lead to differing expected battlefield efforts on the one
hand and to a certain volatility in observed battlefield efforts across war states on the
other hand. In particular, expected individual and total efforts increase with the under-
dog’s closeness to victory.
A graphical intuition for these effects is provided in Figure 4.1.2. The three subfig-
ures depict expected individual as well as total effort levels with respect to pA in the
three war states S = {−1,0,1} for the n= 3 case. Motivational strength for both teams is
assumed to be vA = vB = 1, and hence the changes in pA are due to changes in material
strength ratio levels only. That is, for pA > 0.5, team A is materially favorite and for
pA < 0.5, material advantages lie with team B.
With an increasing imbalance of powers – that is, with pA moving away from pA = 0.5
in either direction – expected individual efforts of the favorite come to rest below those
of the underdog. The underdog behaves more aggressively. Further, the state with the
embattled favorite exhibits the highest total and individual efforts of all states. And
lastly, comparing effort levels for given pA ’s across all three states reveals the volatility
effect brought about by the imbalance of powers.
4.2 War Winning Probabilities
With state-independent battle outcome probabilities, war boils down to a random walk
over war states S = {−(n−1), ...,n−1} that ends with a victory of the respective lead-
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ing team in either of the fringe states S = {−(n− 1),n− 1}. Assuming war to start in
middle state S = 0, the problem of overall winning probabilities for war is structurally
equivalent to the so-called Gambler’s Ruin Problem with two gamblers initially equally
endowed with n units.6 Consequently, overall outcome probabilities are to be described
as follows:
Proposition 9. The overall winning probability, P(i|S = 0), of player i in a tug-of-war
contest with symmetric initial positions and a difference of n victories needed in order to
win is given by:
P(i|S = 0)=
pn
i
pn
i
+ pn
j
(33)
Proof. The probability pin
i
of prevailing in war with symmetric initial positions and with
n surplus battles needed in order to win is equal to the complementary absorption prob-
ability with equal starting endowment n as given in Stern (1975):
pini =
1−
(
1− pi
pi
)n
1−
(
1− pi
pi
)2n (34)
Rearranging leads to Proposition 9.
4.3 Asymmetry and War Duration
By taking a closer look at overall winning probabilities, the expected length of war comes
into focus. Again, thinking of war as analogous to the Gambler’s Ruin Problem proves to
be fruitful. Expected war duration can be expressed in terms of the number n of surplus
battles needed and battle winning probabilities pA:
Proposition 10. (War duration) Take any description D = (αA,αB,vA,vB), and respec-
tive battle outcome probability pA |D . Then:
(a) The expected length L(n, pA) of war with symmetric initial positions and with n sur-
plus battles needed in order to win is given by
L(n, pA)=


n
(
1
1−2pA
)(
(1− pA)
n− pn
A
(1− pA)
n+ pn
A
)
if pA 6=
1
2
n2 if pA =
1
2
(35)
6The Gambler’s Ruin Problem describes a repeated lottery game between two players, A and B, each of
whom is endowed with some (finite) capital endowment. At every stage, one unit of capital is transferred
from A to B with some probability, or from B to A with the respective complementary probability. The
game ends as soon as the first player is bankrupt Takacs (1969).
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(b) Expected war duration L(n, pA) decreases in the imbalance of powers I(pA).
Proof. See E.
An intuition for this observation goes as follows: the more asymmetric teams are
in terms of advantages, the higher are the probabilities that war moves in one rather
than in the other direction. The advantaged team is expected to win battles more fre-
quently than the disadvantaged team, and, as a consequence, a decisive fringe war state
is reached earlier.
5 Conclusion
A multi-stage private value all-pay auction has been presented and solved for subgame
perfect equilibria. The aim of this analysis has been twofold: firstly, endogenizing the
lottery character of war; and secondly, providing empirically testable hypotheses on bat-
tlefield behavior as well as on the length of war. Thereby, the combination of modeling
militarized dispute with a tug-of-war structure and framing individual battles as a mod-
ified private value all-pay auction in the spirit of Clausewitz has proven to be fruitful.
The setup chosen has allowed some light to be shed on the relationship between the
logit Tullock CSF and the all-pay auction - an endeavor that is certainly interesting
for general contest theory, as well. What this model essentially boils down to is an
understanding of the Tullock CSF as the product of a discrete random walk between two
absorption states. Transition probabilities are described by the strength parameters of
the two teams and come about from equilibrium play in repeated private value all-pay
auctions that are linked by a tug-of-war structure.
With this result, possibilities for future research in the context of war open up: a
nation going to war might previously decide on how to optimally choose its parameters
given specified costs. Higher order decision problems regarding the choice of material
and motivational strength attributes are certainly natural extensions to the analysis
done in this paper.
Further, the model presented is in line with several existing empirical findings: ca-
pabilities are often used in order to explain war outcomes – an elaborate and highly
differentiated view on the explanatory power of material strength is found in Biddle
(2004), for example. Material strength enters the model with the parameter αi, which
is positively correlated with chances of winning both in battle as well as in war. Moti-
vation, on the other hand, is seen as an additional ingredient to victory – treatments
thereof are found for example in Manning (1994), Siebold (2006), or Newsome (2007).
This relationship, as well, is depicted in the expressions of battle and overall war out-
come probabilities. And thirdly, the empirical observation that the duration of war is
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negatively correlated with the imbalance of powers between nations (cf. ?) has been
successfully replicated.
Last but not least, new hypotheses on battlefield behavior have been presented.
These hypotheses refer to expected behavior with respect to war states and with re-
spect to the strength ratios between adversaries. Propositions 5 to 8 may be directly
taken to empirical research: The model predicts aggressiveness of the material under-
dog, increasing fighting intensity when the favorite is losing ground and high fighting
volatility accompanying a high imbalance of powers.
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A Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. As shown in Proposition 1 and Lemma 2, equality in φS for both agents in battle
leads to equilibrium effort functions that are linear in φS and to battle outcome proba-
bilities pi, i ∈ {A,B} that are independent of war state S. In the following, it is shown
that the implication works in the opposite direction, too: Assuming state independent
outcome probabilities implies equality in φS for both teams’ agents; hence, stating team
independent φS is equivalent to stating war state independent battle outcome probabil-
ities pA = 1− pB.
Let Vi,S be values of war state S to a randomly chosen agent of team i with valuation
vi and let us assume that outcome probabilities are war state independent and given by
pA = 1− pB. Then VA,S is given by
VA,S =


vA if S = n
pAVA,n+1+ (1− pA)VA,n−1 if S ∈ {−n+1, ...,n−1}
0 if S =−n
(36)
And analogously, VB,S can be written as
VA,S =


vB if S =−n
(1− pA)VB,n+1+ pAVB,n−1 if S ∈ {−n+1, ...,n−1}
0 if S = n
(37)
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The additional payoff in case of winning in war state S ∈ {−n+1, ...,n−1} for an agent of
team i ∈ {A,B} can be expressed by differences in state values, φA,SvA =VA,S+1−VA,S−1,
and φB,SvB =VB,S−1−VB,S+1, respectively.
Taking these differences in state values as defined in (36) and (37) yields two (2n−1)-
equation systems for {A,B}-agents with 2n−1 unknown φi,S:
φA,S =


1− pA
∑n−2
z=−n+1φA,z if S = n−1
pAφA,S+1+ (1− pA)φA,S−1 if S ∈ {−n+2, ...,n−2}
pA
1− pA
φA,−n+2 if S =−n+1
(38)
φB,S =


1− pA
∑n−2
z=−n+1φB,z if S = n−1
pAφB,S+1+ (1− pA)φB,S−1 if S ∈ {−n+2, ...,n−2}
pA
1− pA
φB,−n+2 if S =−n+1
(39)
From this, it is obvious that φA,S = φB,S = φS must hold. Hence, surplus payoffs are
equal.
B Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. Take (22),(23) and the definition of pA from Lemma 2 to write
EβA,S
EβB,S
=
vA
vB
αAvA +2αBvB
2αAvA+αBvB
(40)
Note that the RHS is independent of S. Hence for ∀S,0<D <∞:
∂
EβA,S
EβB,S
∂αA
=−
3αBv
2
A
(αBvB+2αAvA)
2
< 0 (41)
∂
EβA,S
EβB,S
∂vA
=
2
(
α2
B
v2B+αAαBvAvB+α
2
A
v2A
)
vB (αBvB+2αAvA)
2
> 0 (42)
Setting vA = vB, we have
EβA,S
EβB,S
=
αA+2αB
2αA+αB
(43)
Now obviously,
αA >αB⇒
EβA,S
EβB,S
< 1⇔EβA,S <EβB,S (44)
This proves (a). The proof for (b) repeats the last two steps analogously.
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C Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. By the definitions given in (22), (23), and (24), for a given description D and
respective pA |D , individual as well as total expected efforts vary linearly across states
in φS alone. So, only war state variables φS have to be looked at. Rewriting (38) and
setting φA,S =φS yields for S ∈ {−n+1, ...,n−2}
φS =
pA
1− pA
φS′ with S
′
= S+1 (45)
Hence, it must hold for a favorite team A, i.e. pA > 0.5, that
φS >φS′ with S
′
= S+1 (46)
That is, φS (and consequently expected efforts) increases the closer the favorite team A
is to defeat.
D Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. Using (45) with Definition 2 we have
V (pA)= δ(Eβi,−n(−1),Eβi,n−1)| = δ(Eβtot,−(n−1),Eβtot,n−1)| (47)
=
∣∣∣∣ln φ−(n−1)φn−1
∣∣∣∣ (48)
=
∣∣∣∣ln
((
pA
1− pA
)2n−2)∣∣∣∣ (49)
= (2n−2) |ln(pA)− ln(1− pA)| (50)
For 0 < pA < 1, V (pA) exhibits a minimum at pA = 0.5 and positive slopes for pA 6=
0.5. Hence V (pA) behaves analogously to I(pA) in the sense that the signs of partial
derivatives w.r.t pA are equal for a given pA 6= 0.5, and V (pA) = I(pA) = 0 for pA = 0.5.
So, an increase in I(pA) is equivalent to an increase in V (pA), and vice versa.
E Proof of Proposition 10
Proof. The expected length L(n, pA) of war with symmetric initial positions and with n
surplus battles needed in order to win is equal to the expected length of the Gambler’s
Ruin lottery game with equal starting endowment n as given in Stern (1975):
L(n, pA)=


n
(
2pA
1−2pA
)1−2


1−
(
1− pA
pA
)n
1−
(
1− pA
pA
)2n



 if pA 6= 12
n2 if pA =
1
2
(51)
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Rearranging:
=


n
(
1
1−2pA
)(
(1− pA)
n− pn
A
(1− pA)
n+ pn
A
)
if pA 6=
1
2
n2 if pA =
1
2
(52)
This shows (a). Further, it is a simple exercise in algebra to show that
dL(n, pA)
dpA
=


> 0 if pA <
1
2
< 0 if pA >
1
2
(53)
Hence, L(n, pA) behaves analogously to I(pA). This proves (b).
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